[The German Way of War From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich Modern War Studies Read] Epub By Robert M. Citino – eBook or Kindle


10 thoughts on “The German Way of War From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich Modern War Studies

  1. says:

    Robert Citino is one of the leading historians of the German Army in the period 1919 1945 although he has extende

  2. says:

    Robert Citino's book is a very good compendium of the art of making war according to the Prussian Germans from the 17th century to

  3. says:

    At first I'm sorry to say that I don't like North American authors when they speak about European History Lots of them do a very shallow job to understand our way of thinking our cultures even our languages Some of them may be too nationalist in their essays when they speak about a nation with not even 250 year

  4. says:

    Prussian German war machine has always fascinated historians and military buffs alike They were either sweeping the battlef

  5. says:

    Kurz und vives short and lively If one had to pick a catchphrase to describe the typical fashion in which German armies tended to wage

  6. says:

    To some degree your mileage with this book may vary depending on how much you buy into the ways of war school of thought that argues that various nations have identifiable ways of war on the operational level that can be analyzed and comparedEven if you disagree with that premise Citino's work has much to offer Essentially he argues that Ge

  7. says:

    Citino presents the history of the Prussian Army small surrounded and feudal Geography left Prussia with fewer resources than it's powerful neighbors and meant that if it was to survive as a nation it needed to be aggressive and fight short wars It couldn't survive wars of attrition WWI was just one of the wars thru Prussia's history that reinforced this military doctrineWhy I started this book Inter library loan is a fabulous motivator I

  8. says:

    A fantastic sweeping overview of the PrussianGerman war history of the last 400 years Insightful relating the Prussian hist

  9. says:

    A little too selective in its choice of battles and ridiculously blinkered in its definition of German

  10. says:

    I'm hit or miss with this particular historian Up front there are parts of this book that unless you are REALLY i

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review ☆ E-book, or Kindle E-pub ´ Robert M. Citino

The German Way of War From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich Modern War Studies

For Frederick the Great the prescription for warfare was simple kurz und vives short and lively wars that relied upon swift powerful and decisive military operations Robert Citino takes us on a dramatic march through Prussian and German military history to show how that primal theme played out. Robert Citino is one of the leading historians of the German Army in the period 1919 1945 although he has extended his scope to the study of Blitzkrieg and armoured warfare generally His works are always meticulously researched drawing heavily on primary sources and provide significant insights I was therefore very interested to see this work where he has taken a much longer time period from the 1650s to the 1940s in an attempt to capture the essence of the German way of war The book was of especial interest to me given that I must confess my knowledge of the Napoleonic wars is only passing and of the wars before that sketchy at bestCitino starts by noting that the Germans themselves emphatically denied that they had any kind of scheme that enabled them to win wars There was no magic idea or concept He therefore explores the actual approach and experience of the Prussian German Army from the period of Frederick William the Great Elector through Frederick the Great to the time of Scharnhorst and Bluecher through to Moltke Schlieffen and then Seeckt and the WehrmachtWhat comes out to Citino is a simple but powerful picture Prussia and then the united Germany had no natural borders behind which it could shelter Nor did it have the geographic or economic depth that would enable it to withstand a long drawn out conflict Success not to say survival depended on wars being lively and short That meant that the army had to move fast both when moving from one part of the theatre of operations to another and in the context of battle Minor victories were insufficient the enemy needed to be defeated uickly and completely That reuired attacks to be made against the flanks and rear of the enemy and for those attacks to be multiplied in their impact through the factors of surprise and energyCitino underlines that these necessities reuired commanders to act uickly and decisively making their own rapid assessment of the situation and leading their troops with exceptional aggression always marching to the sound of the guns and attacking at every opportunity This would throw the enemy off balance and convince them that the battle was lost He notes that Prussian German commanders repeatedly ignored the overall plan set out by the commander in chief in favour of the offensive opportunities that opened up in front of them often threatening the success of that overall plan yet still securing victory through the overwhelming impact on the enemy And rather than be disciplined for this such commanders were repeatedly promotedCitino notes some key factors First this independence of command reflected the traditional relationship between the Junkers and the king and so might be considered sui generis rather than generally applicable or transferable That would help explain the major debate within the German Army during the 1880s and 1890s over whether commanders below battalion level should be accorded the same freedoms the fact that they ultimately were and indeed this was further extended to NCOs may suggest that Citino was too cautious over the potential for Auftragstaktik to travel beyond its original cultural contextCitino ends the book with what he considers the death of the traditional style of command with the assumption of control of the army by Hitler and the switch to detailed control by both the Fuehrer and senior commanders in December 1941 While part of this clearly stemmed from Hitler s personal approach to command Citino argues that it should not be forgotten that much of the actual change was implemented by senior generals within the army itself arguing that part of this may have been a result of a mismatch between the freedom reuired for the traditional independence of command and the complexity of battle in a context of coordinated artillery and air support This would suggest that Auftragstaktik to use a shorthand would be unlikely to be valid in the context of modern armoured warfare I have to say that I am not convinced The factors of fire support were of huge importance by the end of the First World War yet in many respects the scope for independent command by junior leaders reached a level never before experienced While not my own area of expertise I believe there were numerous examples during the 2003 Ira War where US commanders operated with significant independence in order to secure critical though unexpected victoriesThese issues notwithstanding this must rate as one of the most important books on the German way of warfare to have been published in recent years I know I will come back to it freuently in order to test and inspire my own writing Mr. Francis Wife powerful and decisive military operations Robert Citino takes us on a dramatic march through Prussian and German military history to show how that The Shadow People primal theme Demons, Yes--But Thank God for Good Angels primary sources and The Pride and Prejudice Movie Cookbook provide significant insights I was therefore very interested to see this work where he has taken a much longer time Vietnam Perkasie period from the 1650s to the 1940s in an attempt to capture the essence of the German way of war The book was of especial interest to me given that I must confess my knowledge of the Napoleonic wars is only Losing Strength and Dexterity period of Frederick William the Great Elector through Frederick the Great to the time of Scharnhorst and Bluecher through to Moltke Schlieffen and then Seeckt and the WehrmachtWhat comes out to Citino is a simple but Afghanistan powerful The Black Sheeps Secret Child picture Prussia and then the united Germany had no natural borders behind which it could shelter Nor did it have the geographic or economic depth that would enable it to withstand a long drawn out conflict Success not to say survival depended on wars being lively and short That meant that the army had to move fast both when moving from one The Billionaires Desire part of the theatre of operations to another and in the context of battle Minor victories were insufficient the enemy needed to be defeated uickly and completely That reuired attacks to be made against the flanks and rear of the enemy and for those attacks to be multiplied in their impact through the factors of surprise and energyCitino underlines that these necessities reuired commanders to act uickly and decisively making their own rapid assessment of the situation and leading their troops with exceptional aggression always marching to the sound of the guns and attacking at every opportunity This would throw the enemy off balance and convince them that the battle was lost He notes that Prussian German commanders repeatedly ignored the overall After the Flood plan set out by the commander in chief in favour of the offensive opportunities that opened up in front of them often threatening the success of that overall Trust in Tomorrow plan yet still securing victory through the overwhelming impact on the enemy And rather than be disciplined for this such commanders were repeatedly After the Flood potential for Auftragstaktik to travel beyond its original cultural contextCitino ends the book with what he considers the death of the traditional style of command with the assumption of control of the army by Hitler and the switch to detailed control by both the Fuehrer and senior commanders in December 1941 While Bronxwood part of this clearly stemmed from Hitler s NAKED ANIME GIRLS 3 personal approach to command Citino argues that it should not be forgotten that much of the actual change was implemented by senior generals within the army itself arguing that Acquiring the Mind of Christ part of this may have been a result of a mismatch between the freedom reuired for the traditional independence of command and the complexity of battle in a context of coordinated artillery and air support This would suggest that Auftragstaktik to use a shorthand would be unlikely to be valid in the context of modern armoured warfare I have to say that I am not convinced The factors of fire support were of huge importance by the end of the First World War yet in many respects the scope for independent command by junior leaders reached a level never before experienced While not my own area of expertise I believe there were numerous examples during the 2003 Ira War where US commanders operated with significant independence in order to secure critical though unexpected victoriesThese issues notwithstanding this must rate as one of the most important books on the German way of warfare to have been The Internal Magic of Activision Dragster published in recent years I know I will come back to it freuently in order to test and inspire my own writing

Free read The German Way of War From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich Modern War Studies

Ores the role played by the Prussian army in elevating a small vulnerable state to the ranks of the European powers describes how nineteenth century victories over Austria and France made the German army the most respected in Europe and reviews the lessons learned from the trenches of World War. A little too selective in its choice of battles and ridiculously blinkered in its definition of German

review ☆ E-book, or Kindle E-pub ´ Robert M. Citino

Time and time again Citino focuses on operational warfare to demonstrate continuity in German military campaigns from the time of Elector Frederick Wilhelm and his great sleigh drive against the Swedes to the age of Adolf Hitler and the blitzkrieg to the gates of Moscow Along the way he undersc. Prussian German war machine has always fascinated historians and military buffs alike They were either sweeping the battlefield and winning German wars of unification or putting up so much of a fight that it took a coalition of most powerful states to finally bring them down WW1 WW2Citino asks himself is there a German way of war that makes them such formidable force unlike any other Is there some secret ingredient that makes German armies so strong He answers yes and identifies 3 key components or principles of German way of war German here means Brandenburg Prussia and unified Germany1 Wars must be short and sharp hit the enemy with full force as soon as possible and win a decissive victory as soon as possible as well because economy and population levels can t sustain long attritional wars against bigger richer states2 Operational and strategic mobility of armies While Citino concentrates on operational level that is moving your army on the battlefield to hit enemy in flanks or rear strategic mobility is important as well as Frederick the Great proved when he moved his armies all over the place3 When in doubt attack Commanders have to be agressive their task is to find enemy and destroy it Commanders have a strong degree of autonomy specially important later when armies became too big to be commanded by a single person and often operated divided into several parts with spotty and slow communication between themCitino then looks at German military history to prove his points Star performer is of course Frederick the Great specially during 7 years war War which ironically was not short violating 1 principle He proves that Frederick acted agressively and used mobility to full extent gaining upper hand Napoleonic wars and wars of german unification are given same tretment pointing out where principles were applied and how it lead to successCitino tries to answer why Germany failed in WW1 answer being agressiveness was lacking at key moments at key points which led to loss of mobility trench warfare and long attritional war which Germany was doomed to loose 1 principleOne could accuse Citino of cherry picking evidence eg Second Silesian war is given only a passing mention however he tries to explain defeats Jena Ausrstadt opening phase of WW1 west as failing to follow the 3 principles My biggest problem is with conclusion mostly two key pointsFirst Citino ends his analysis with German failure at the gates of Moscow in december 1941 On one hand he makes a case that post WW1 German development rested on regaining mobility on strategicoperational level Motorization combined arms doctrine and better communications allowed Germans to advance rapidly outpacing less motorized enemies and unhinge them something with which I agree However failure at Moscow was not a failure of such concept it was problem of distance tenacity of Red Army massive mobilization capability of Soviet Union weather etc However in next 2 years Germans tried to regain that ability Opening phase of 1942 summer offensive Case Blau saw Wehrmacht once again advancing rapidly shocking Soviets Same with 1943 Kursk offensive where Germns tried once again to regain mobility breaking into Soviet rear area and mauling assembled forces Opening phases of these two offensive show that there was nothing inherently wrong with german doctrine what doomed them were other factors These two cases should be included as well because they showed Germans stuck to their doctrine and also why this doctrine failed in the end It failed becasue Soviets were able to deny Germans their mobility first in the ruins of Stalingrad which also hampered combined arms close air and artillery support was less effective because of close proximity of forces then next year by throwing so many obstacles in front of Germans they simply ran out of steam But even so Kharkov counteroffensive Manstein t counterstroke showed that when Germans held the mobility edge and acted agressively they could come on topSecond is that Citino doesn t or refuses to see a direct heir of German approach Israel After it was created Israel followed German principles to the letter that is 1948 49 war does not fall into this cathegory but rest do Short wars start with massive blow battlefield agressivness And you can even see constant German problem that is field commanders acting on their own even without or against orders from higher command Even as late as 1982 Lebanon war Sharon ran his own show hoodwinking Israeli government and outright lying about his intentions Israeli defence minsiter has somewhat different position than in other western contries Even when war opened with Israel on the defensive 1973 battlefield agressiveness was obvious with IDF trying with counter attack right away at Sinai within hours of war s start even when situation was far from clear I can t say if this is due to the fact that Citino focuses so much on German tree that he can t see forrest around it or because he doesn t want to euate anything Israeli with anything German for obvious reasons but omission is telling either way and points to Citino s partial failure at final analysisOverall a decent if somewhat superficial analysis I d recomend it as a way to auire understanding of basic currents of German war making doctrine thinking and performance and applying them when studying either past conflict in detail As I said Citiono identifies what makes German Way of War so special but then fails to apply those elements wider

  • Hardcover
  • 428
  • The German Way of War From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich Modern War Studies
  • Robert M. Citino
  • English
  • 21 January 2019
  • 9780700614103

About the Author: Robert M. Citino

Robert M Citino is an American history professor scholar and writer currently teaching at the University of North Texas He specializes in German military history and has earned acclaim by writing several historical books on the subject He has appeared as a consultant on the History Channel several times on the subject of World War II and German military tactics